The Foundation for Constitutional Democracy

Judging from various articles, Israeli nationalists, looking forward to the projected 2006 Knesset election, have not learned a lesson from the pernicious results of the 2003 election, from which this country is now suffering. Hence this article.

Certain opponents of Prime Minister Sharon’s Gaza disengagement/deportation plan may be shocked to learn that they themselves enabled Sharon to foist this plan on Israel. How? By urging people, in the January 2003 Knesset election, to vote Likud and not “waste” their votes on a small party. These nationalists were still bemoaning the June 1992 election, when certain small right-wing parties entered the race and unwittingly prevented the Likud-religious camp from winning enough seats to form the government. These small parties are still blamed for Labor’’s assumption of power, from which the Oslo disaster followed.

What these benighted nationalists failed to see is that the political situation in 2003 had dramatically changed. Labor had been discredited by its Oslovian policy of “territory for peace,” and the party itself was divided. Polls indicated that Labor would receive only 15 seats, while Likud would win at least 40. Hence the entry of a small nationalist party in the 2003 race could not possibly prevent a Likud victory.

The political situation in 2003 was unique. During the previous three decades, the contest between Labor and Likud was rather close. Many people——especially the religious——voted Likud only to prevent Labor from gaining power. In 2003, however, it was obvious not only that the next government would be formed by the Likud, but by a prime minister committed to a Palestinian state—Ariel Sharon. What nationalists failed to see is that Sharon’’s ability to manipulate his cabinet toward a Palestinian state would depend on the margin of the Likud victory. This margin would determine whether the Likud’’s coalition partners would support or oppose a Palestinian state, and whether its opponents in Sharon’’s cabinet would be numerous enough to prevent his pursuing Labor’’s objective.

Therefore, it was absolutely necessary for the nationalist camp to prevent the Likud from receiving too many mandates. The only way nationalists could do this was to vote for parties to the right of the Likud, namely, National Union, the National Religious Party, and Herut.

Of these three parties, Herut, the smallest, had the clearest nationalist position, as Moshe Feiglin admitted. The mere fact that Herut leader Michael Kleiner had refused to join Sharon’s 2001 national unity government because of Sharon’’s commitment to a Palestinian state justified voting Herut, the more so in view of Herut’s alliance with the Yamin Israel party.

Unfortunately, certain misguided nationalists, such as the leadership of Professors for a Strong Israel (PSI) and Manhigut Yehudit, misled the public by urging voters not to “waste” their ballots on a small party. A lot of campaign money was wasted by PSI on ads declaiming against Herut despite my efforts, as Yamin’s president, to clarify the nationalist issue. Nor is this all.

Aware of the crucial importance of limiting the Likud to roughly 32 seats, the present writer—before the Herut-Yamin list was formed—urged Moshe Feiglin to ditch Likud and join as well as head the Yamin Israel party. Instead, Feiglin encouraged people to vote Likud!

Now, suppose Likud had won only 32 seats (instead of the 38 it actually won), so that six additional seats would have gone to parties on the right. Since Likud MKs, for various reasons, would balk at sharing ministries with Labor, Sharon would have had to form a government coalition with the religious parties and National Union. This would exclude Shinui, which had pledged not to sit in a government with religious parties, especially Shas. Without Shinui, Sharon could not possibly ram his Gaza deportation plan through the cabinet; indeed, the plan would have died before it was born. (And let us not forget the Road Map.)

Had the voters not been turned away from the Herut-Yamin Israel list, the latter would have passed the electoral threshold—it was within a few thousand votes of doing so. Kleiner would now be in the Knesset. Imagine how vehemently he would oppose and arouse public opposition to Sharon——which no one is now doing. But those few thousand votes were lost because well-meaning people and organizations campaigned against Herut on the naïve grounds that Herut would “divide the nationalist camp.”

This post mortem is not sour grapes. It is a warning about the next Knesset election. Those who are either swelling the ranks of the Likud, like Manhigut Yehudit, or declaiming against any small, genuine nationalist party, should think again. Although the Likud is likely to lose some seats because of Sharon’’s adoption of Labor’’s Gaza evacuation policy, he nonetheless enjoys——for the lack of a strong alternative—considerable public support. The public’’s misplaced confidence in generals remains a decisive factor in Israeli politics. Therefore, it’’s more important than ever for extra-parliamentary nationalist groups to unite with a view to diminishing the number of Likud mandates. They need not fear the ascendancy of a left-wing government. The Left is split and largely discredited.

Summing up: those nationalists who prevented Herut from breaking the electoral threshold in the January 2003 election, or who lured people into the Likud, unwittingly contributed to Sharon’’s Gaza deportation plan. They should engage in serious self-criticism and develop a more sophisticated understanding of Israel’’s political system—a system that thwarts the clearly expressed will of the Jewish people.